This originally apeared as a Background Memo (pp. 32-35) in the report Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community, a publication of The Intelligence and Policy Project of Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.
Covert action is one of many foreign policy tools used by policymakers to advance national interests. Used in select international efforts, covert action encompasses a broad range of activities outside the operations of traditional intelligence collection. Sanctioned by the White House and overseen by Congress, covert action can provide results and otherwise unavailable information.
This memo provides an overview of covert action, including its legal basis, authorization and notification procedures, and historical examples.
What is Covert Action?
According to National Security Act Sec. 503 (e), covert action is, "An activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly." Proper covert actions are undertaken because policymakers—not the intelligence agencies—believe that secret means are the best way to achieve a desired end or a specific policy goal.
Covert action encompasses a broad spectrum of activities, but may include:
One distinction between covert action and other overt activities, such as traditional diplomatic or military operations, is that U.S. officials could plausibly deny involvement in the activity. This "plausible deniability," however, is predicated upon the covert action remaining secret.
A Historically Controversial Tool
Covert action is a necessary—yet sometimes controversial—instrument of U.S. foreign policy. As the challenge of Soviet hegemony emerged as the principal threat to national security, the U.S. used covert action on a wide scale with the goal of combating the threat of worldwide Soviet domination. These efforts resulted in varying degrees of success.
Policymakers still use this foreign policy tool today. For example, covert action was an important device for U.S. national security interests soon after 9/11, as CIA paramilitary groups, U.S. Special Forces and indigenous Northern Alliance forces in 2001-2002 removed the Taliban from power in Afghanistan.
Parameters of Covert Action
U.S. law authorizes CIA to "conduct covert action activities approved by the President." The amended Executive Order 12333 (July 2008) further clarifies:
The Iran-Contra experience led to a more substantial and formalized role for Congress for overseeing and authorizing covert action. In the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act, Congress established the following procedures for covert action:
Examples of Covert Action
In 1951, Iran elected Mohammed Mossadeq Prime Minister, who ran under a platform calling for nationalizing the domestic oil industry. At the time, the United Kingdom had considerable oil interests in the country through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. After the election, Mossadeq nationalized the oil industry, deeply upsetting the British. The U.K., under Prime Minister Winston Churchill then turned to the U.S. to help remove Mossadeq from power. Through a series of covert actions, the CIA worked with the British Secret Intelligence Service to orchestrate the fall of the Mossadeq government and to install the Shah in power in Iran.
For many years, Operation Ajax was viewed as tactically successful, as it achieved the U.S. policymakers' stated goal at the time. However, some suggest the operation was counterproductive and had long-term negative repercussions for the U.S., as the Iranian monarchy fell a generation later to the anti-U.S. clerical regime now ruling Iran.
CIA in Afghanistan 1979-89
Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, the CIA launched its largest-ever covert action program to arm the Afghan resistance. During the next ten years, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan provided the Afghans with billions of dollars of weapons and supplies, including advanced anti-aircraft missiles. The armaments and aid proved decisive, neutralizing Soviet air-support in the latter stages of the conflict and eventually causing the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan.
In another example of far-reaching consequences, however, a number of the fighters that the U.S. trained and equipped during the 1980s may be fighting American and NATO troops in Afghanistan today.
Sources
Bearden, Milt. The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA's Final Showdown with the KGB. New York: Random House, 2003.
"Executive Order: Further Amendments to Executive Order 12333." United States Intelligence Activities. 31 July 2008.
Johnson, Loch K and James Wirtz. Intelligence and National Security. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah's men: an American coup and the roots of Middle East terror. Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2008.
Lowenthal, Mark. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 2nd Edition. CQ Press: Washington DC, 2003.
O'Brien, Michael. John F. Kennedy. New York: Macmillan, 2006.
Tenet, George. At the Center of the Storm. New York: Harper Collins, 2007.
Turner, Stansfield. Burn Before Reading: Presidents, CIA Directors, and Secret Intelligence. New York: Hyperion, 2005.
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Recommended citationRosenbach, Eric and Aki Peritz. "Covert Action." Memorandum, "Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, July 2009.
Copy to Clipboard Recommended citationRosenbach, Eric and Aki Peritz. "Covert Action." Memorandum, "Confrontation or Collaboration? Congress and the Intelligence Community," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, July 2009.